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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Close Corporation Stock Repurchase Agreements
Today, hundreds of small, closely held corporations are trying to
devise methods to release cash to their shareholders or to their share-
holder's estates, without imposing a heavy income tax burden upon
either of them. One method of doing so is through the use of a cor-
poration stock repurchase plan. The essence of such a plan is the
sale of stock by a shareholder to the corporation in return for cash.
The object is to provide the shareholder and his family with cash, in-
stead of the non-marketable stock of a small corporation.
One method of achieving this result is to execute an agreement
between each shareholder and the corporation, whereby the corpora-
tion agrees to buy, and the shareholder agrees to sell his stock to the
corporation upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, such as
death or termination of employment. The agreement gives the cor-
poration the option or duty to purchase the stock at an agreed price,
and binds the shareholder to sell to the corporation, or to transfer his
stock subject to the corporation's option.
Another method used is an agreement whereby the shareholders
individually contract to buy out the interest of any shareholder who
dies, or terminates his employment with the corporation.' However,
such a plan may be impractical where the cash necessary to buy out a
shareholder's interest is to be provided by the proceeds from an in-
surance policy on the shareholder's life, taken out by the other share-
holders. That is, where the largest interest to be purchased is owned
by an older individual, the rates for insurance on his life may be ex-
cessive in relation to the income of younger, minority shareholders,
who would pay the premiums on the policy. The most important fac-
tor, regardless of the age of the insured, is that the premiums must
be paid with after-tax dollars; that is, money left after the share-
holder has paid his personal income tax.2
This note is limited to stock repurchase plans to which the "dose"
corporation is a party. Such a corporation is not of the large, publicly
owned variety like General Motors or United States Steel, but one
with a limited number of shareholders. These shareholders are gen-
erally, though not always, the officer-employees of the corporation.
ADVANTAGES OF THE PLANS
The primary advantage of a stock repurchase plan to the remain-
ing shareholders is solidification of control without a costly battle
1. Because of the federal attribution rules, an agreement of this nature may be the only
feasible type where most of the stock is owned by a family group. See note 11 infra, for a
discussion of stock redemption and the family attribution rules found in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 318.
2. For a more complete discussion, see Cunningham, Stock "Buy-Out" Plans: Selection and
Drafting, 18 MD. L. REv. 277 (1958). For comparison of the effect of payment of premiums
by the corporation, see note 14 infra and accompanying text.
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with the retiring shareholder or his heirs. Often, upon the death of
a shareholder, his widow or his widow's second husband will attempt
to take the shareholder's place in the business, although neither is
qualified to do so. The remaining shareholders are usually reluctant
to permit interference with the business, and may, therefore, seek to
buy out the widow's interest in the corporation. If a plan were not
in effect at the death of the shareholder, these conflicting desires
could precipitate a long and costly battle.
Further, key employees are more likely to remain with the corpo-
ration when a repurchase plan is in effect, because they are assured
that the business will continue under the same management, even
though one of the officer-shareholders should die. If these key em-
ployees own any stock in the corporation, they can look forward to a
greater equity interest upon the death of a principal shareholder, be-
cause his stock will then be retired and the proportionate interest of
the remaining shareholders will increase. 3
The deceased shareholder is guaranteed that upon his death, his
family will have ready cash instead of non-marketable corporation
assets. If a repurchase plan were not in effect, the widow might
find it impossible to sell her shares in the open market, and thus
might be forced to sell to the surviving shareholders at an unreason-
ably low price, if they would purchase her stock at all.
A purchase plan guarantees that the corporation will buy her
shares at a fair price. The price, or the method for determining the
price,4 will generally be fair because the bargain is made when all the
shareholders are alive and are uncertain who will die first. Thus,
each party to the agreement will want the price to be fair to both the
deceased shareholder and to the corporation because, at the time the
agreement is made, none of the shareholders can know whether his
shares will be sold.
If the widow were forced to keep the stock because she could not
find a buyer at a fair price, she undoubtedly would realize little or
no income. The stock in a dose corporation generally does not pay
more than nominal dividends because much of the income may be
siphoned off in salaries to officer-shareholders in order to avoid dou-
3. The assured continuity of the business also makes it easier to obtain long-term bank loans.
4. A number of common methods, with many variations, are available to determine the price
to be paid for the stock. (1) Book value can be used. The problem here is whether to in-
dude the value of insurance proceeds in the book value of the corporation. Suppose X and
Y each own half of a $100,000 corporation and the corporation owns a $50,000 policy on the
life of each. (a) When book value prior to death is used: if X dies his estate receives $50,000
cash and Y receives a corporation worth $100,000. (b) When book value after death is used:
the insurance proceeds increase the value of the stock and X's share is now worth about
$75,000, but the corporation presumably only has $50,000 cash, so X's estate may have to take
$25,000 in notes. (2) Book value plus a stated premium per share. (3) Appraisal by inde-
pendent parties. (4) Capitalization of earnings (e.g., 5 or 6 times the average earnings for
the preceding five years). (5) Periodic negotiation of a new price by the parties, the sale
price being the last negotiated price.
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ble taxation, 5 or may remain undistributed because the majority
shareholders are in a high personal income tax bracket and do not
want additional income taxable at high ordinary income rates. Thus,
a repurchase plan guarantees the widow a ready buyer for her stock
at a fair price and, where the stock is to be redeemed with the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on her husband's life, she is assured that
the buyer will have the cash available to pay for her shares.
Tax Aspects
Aside from the above advantages to both the retiring and remain-
ing shareholders, there are also important tax advantages inherent in
a repurchase plan. Normally, it is very difficult to take cash out of a
corporation without paying a heavy income tax because, generally, the
favorable capital gains6 treatment is denied unless the stock is sold to
an outsider, or unless all or most of it is sold back to the corpora-
tion.7 Because the stock usually has a limited market value, and be-
cause the shareholder is usually unwilling to give up his interest in
the business, neither method is generally used during the life of the
shareholder. If the shareholders attempt to redeem a portion of
their stock for cash on a pro rata basis, the result will not be the ex-
pected capital gain treatment, but rather, a dividend taxable to each
shareholder at ordinary income tax rates.8 This is true because the
shareholders maintain the same proportionate control of the corpora-
tion as they had before the redemption.
Because it is so difficult to take cash out of a close corporation
without relinquishing one's proportionate interest therein, or suffer-
ing a heavy tax burden, many shareholders prefer to retain their en-
tire interest until death. There are great advantages to a sharehold-
er's family if he permits his spouse to redeem the stock after his
death, rather than converting it into cash during his lifetime.
When property, including stock, passes to a decedent's estate, it
receives a tax basis equal to its fair market value at the date of the
decedent's death (or the value within one year from that date, if
so elected)." Because of this step up in basis, when the stock is sold
5. If money is paid in dividends, the corporation must first pay a tax on the earnings neces-
sary to accumulate dividend money, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. Then the individual
must pay a tax at his personal tax rate on the money received as dividends, INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 61 (a) (7). However, if the earnings are paid in the form of salaries, then the only
tax payable is by the individual. Thus, the close corporation attempts to pay out as much of
its income as possible in the form of salaries to officer-shareholders.
6. A maximum tax of 25%. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(b).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302 (b).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302. It is very difficult to turn stock in for cash and still
retain an interest in a small corporation without having the money received characterized as
a dividend. In order to escape unfavorable ordinary income treatment, the redemption must
be: (1) not essentially equivalent to a dividend, or (2) a substantially disproportionate re-
demption, or (3) a complete termination of the shareholder's interest. Ibid.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5§ 101 4 (a), 2032.
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by the shareholder's estate to the corporation, there will ordinarily
be no gain and, therefore, no tax to the estate, because the stock pre-
sumably will be sold for its fair market value.'0
These tax advantages, when coupled with a stock repurchase plan
which guarantees his widow a fair price for his stock, make it very
desirable for a shareholder to retain his stock until death. He can
be relatively assured that his widow will have, at his death, stock
which she can convert into cash with little or no tax cost.
However, one must be aware of a danger which exists if the ma-
jority of the stock is owned by a family group. An individual is con-
sidered to own stock owned by or for his spouse, children, grand-
children, or parents." Thus, when stock is owned by a family group,
any money received when the estate redeems the deceased's stock may
be taxed as a dividend to the estate,12 because the estate is regarded
as though it owned the stock held by other members of the deceased's
family. In this situation a corporation repurchase plan will be im-
practical. However, the estate will, if it meets certain tests,13 be
permitted to redeem enough stock to pay death taxes without incur-
ring dividend treatment on the money received.
Insurance Funding
Favorable tax treatment and a guaranteed price are of little value
to a widow if the corporation does not have cash available to pur-
chase her stock. The widow will usually want the funds at once, not
at some future date. One of the more common methods of assuring
that the corporation will have immediate cash available to pay for
the stock is through the use of life insurance to fund the stock repur-
chase plan.
To implement the repurchase plan, the corporation insures the
life of each shareholder and designates itself beneficiary upon the
death of the shareholder. When a shareholder dies, the cash pro-
ceeds then become available to repurchase his stock in the corpora-
tion. Such a plan permits the surviving shareholders to acquire the
decedent's stock at a low yearly cost, the price being the premiums
paid to insure the decedent's life.
A further advantage of funding with insurance is that corporation
10. The valuation of the stock set by the repurchase plan is acceptable for estate tax valuation
purposes. Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a) (1); Note, 20 U. PITr. L. REv. 66 (1958); Hoff-
man, 1954 Code Can Turn Buy-Sell Agreement Into Disastrous Tax Traps for Shareholders, 4
J. TAXATION 322 (1956); Leon, The Role of Constructive Ownership in Determining
Whether a Stock Redemption Is Taxed as a Dividend or Capital Gain, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 568
(1956); Winton & Hoffman, A Case Study of Stock Redemptions Under Sections 302 and
318 of the New Code, 10 TAX L. REv. 363 (1955); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of
Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1958).
12. See Rev. Rul. 103, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 159.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303.
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funds may be used to pay the premiums on the policies. Even
though the corporation is denied a business expense deduction for the
premiums paid,14 it is still desirable to use corporate funds because a
double tax is avoided. The premiums are paid in corporation dol-
lars, not shareholder money which has been subjected to two taxes
one at the corporate level and one at the individual level.
Another desirable feature of insurance funding is that it creates
no taxable income to either the corporation or the shareholders.
When the insured dies, the proceeds of the policy on his life are not
income to the beneficiary corporation. 5 Nor are the premiums paid
by the corporation taxable as a dividend to the shareholder where
the corporation owns the policy, pays the premiums, and is the bene-
ficiary of the policy.16 Thus, the advantages of insurance funding
are twofold: an easy, pay-as-you-go method is provided to guaran-
tee that there will be cash available to purchase the deceased share-
holder's stock, and the money used to pay the premiums, though not
allowable as a business deduction to the corporation, has still been
subjected to only a single tax at the corporation level.'T
ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS
Mutuality of Obligation
It is most disconcerting to find that doubt still exists as to whether
a corporation repurchase agreement can be enforced. Yet, there is a
decision' 8 which expressly holds that such agreements are not enforce-
able. The decision is based solely upon the contract theory of
"mutuality."' 9
Generally, if there is an attempt to create a bilateral contract in
which the only duty demanded of one party is neither detrimental to
him, nor beneficial to the other party, then the contract is not valid.20
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 264.
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a).
16. Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cit. 1957); Casale v. Commissioner, 247
F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), acq., Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No. 21, at 8. For a
full discussion, see Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 339 (1958); Lawthers, Weakness in Casale Decision: Insolvency Could Destroy
Benefit to Owner-Employee, 5 J. TAXATION 342 (1956). Beware of the attempt of the Com-
missioner to assert that the money received is a constructive dividend to the remaining share-
holders. Zipp v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 119 (6th Cit. 1958); Holsey v. Commissioner, 258
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
17. A further advantage is that the corporation can build up sufficient insurance reserves to
purchase the stock without great fear of an accumulated earnings tax penalty. Pelton Steel
Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958).
18. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928).
19. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 105 (3d ed. 1957) for a full discussion of the various
types of mutuality and the confusion resulting from the improper use of the term.
20. Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912);
Blanchard v. Haber, 166 la. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 5 104
(3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 80 (1932).
[March
NOTES
This is often characterized as lack of "mutuality of obligation." In
fact, the problem is one of consideration. If one party can fully es-
cape performance of his duties under the contract without incurring
liability, then there is no consideration and, hence, no contract. It
should be noted, however, that when the obligation undertaken by
one party is merely not commensurate with that undertaken by the
other, the contract is valid because both parties must still perform
their promised duties.2 ' Thus, if the performance of a promise is
conditioned upon the occurrence of an event, the contract is valid, un-
less the condition is within the arbitrary control of the promisor.
22
New York Decisions
The doctrine of "mutuality" was invoked by the highest court of
New York in Topken, Loring & Swartz, Incorporated v. Schwartz, 23
to hold invalid a stock repurchase agreement. The New York Penal
Code forbids a director of a corporation to apply any portion of its
funds, except funds from surplus, to the purchase of its own shares.
In Topken, it was immaterial to the court whether the corporation
had surplus at the time of the execution of the repurchase agreement.
The court reasoned that it was possible that the corporation would
have no surplus at the time of the repurchase. Were this true, then
the corporation would be unable to perform its promise in view of
the fact that the repurchase could, lawfully, only be funded from sur-
plus. Thus, because the agreement might not be binding on the cor-
poration, the court held that it was not binding on the shareholder.
Hence, the contract was void ab initio. Inasmuch as this decision,
rendered by the highest court of the state, stands unreversed, it ap-
parently is still the law in New York. The court did not take into
consideration the fact that a contract may be valid even though the
promise of one party be conditioned upon the occurrence or non-oc-
currence of an event.2" The decision has been criticized 25 and side-
stepped,26 but not overruled.
The Topken rule may have been modified by a later decision of
21. Lindner v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 252 Ark. 241, 252 S.W.2d 631 (1952).
22. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 5 103 (3d ed. 1957).
23. 249 N.Y. 206,163 N.E. 735 (1928).
24. City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Comm'n, 2 N.J. Super. 278, 63 A.2d 552 (1948),
modified on other grounds, 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS S
103 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 77 (1932). An argument might be made
that here the promisor (corporation) can arbitrarily determine if there will be a surplus at
the time the agreement is to be enforced. However, it can be argued that the corporation can-
not arbitrarily do so because it must act in good faith. The reasoning of the court did not
cover this point.
25. 42 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1929); 29 COLUM. L. REv. 356 (1929); Note, 15 CORNELL
L.Q. 108 (1929); Note, 15 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253 (1941).
26. Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1940); Ionic Shop, Inc. v. Rothfield, 64 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct 1946).
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the same New York court in Cross v. Beguelin .2  Here, the court
held an agreement to repurchase stock valid at its inception, where
surplus was available when the contract was made. The corporation
in this case was in financial difficulty at the time for performance
and had been put into the hands of a creditor's committee. The com-
mittee had paid all existing creditor's claims and still had money
available. There were two claims against this surplus: one by a
shareholder, Cross, who was a party to the repurchase agreement;
and a second, by officers who had earned salaries after the repur-
chase agreement had been executed. The surplus was insufficient to
meet both claims. The court held that Cross was entitled to the
surplus because the officers had notice of the corporation's prior in-
debtedness to Cross when they extended credit to the corporation in
the form of services. Although the court found that the repurchase
agreement was valid when made, the holding of this decision does
not overrule Topken, because the corporation was not a party to this
action. 8
Later New York courts have made every effort to avoid the
holding of the Topken case. In the leading case, Greater New York
Carpet House, Incorporated v. Herschmann,29 the court implied con-
sideration from the fact that the corporation agreed to pay premiums
on a life insurance policy, the proceeds of which were to be used to
redeem the shareholder's stock. The shareholder's widow, in re-
liance upon the Topken decision, refused to sell the stock to the cor-
poration. In a suit by the corporation, the contract was held valid
because of the implied consideration. The court stated that lack of
sufficient funds in surplus at the time of repurchase was available
only as a defense to the enforcement of the contract. Another court
held immaterial the fact that surplus was not available at the time
of the execution of the repurchase agreement. Their sole concern
was that it be available when payment for the shares became due.30
In still another case wherein mutuality was an issue, the court disre-
garded the mutuality problem because no proof was offered that the
corporation did not have a surplus at the time of performance.3' In
short, no New York court has followed the Topken case. The var-
ious means and methods of reasoning used to avoid its impact have
seriously impaired the Topken decision's value as precedent.
Ohio Decisions
In Ohio, the mutuality problem has never been raised in a stock
repurchase case. In Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Company,32 where
27. 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E. 378 (1929).
28. Followed in Brost v. East Coast Shipyards, Inc., 105 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
29. 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1940).
30. Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
31. Murphy v. George Murphy, Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 647, 166 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
32. 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939).
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the defendant's duty was to sell all of a particular commodity that
was required by the plaintiff, the court held:
So long as there is consideration for the obligation of one party to
purchase merchandise from another, it is not always essential that there
be mutuality of obligation between them....P
The Fuchs case is analogous to a stock repurchase situation in that
the vendee's obligation in the Fuchs case was conditioned upon his
requiring "something," and, in the stock repurchase situation, the
corporation's obligation to purchase is conditioned upon its having
sufficient surplus. The holding of the Fuchs case can be used as the
basis for an argument that, so long as there is consideration, a con-
ditional contract is valid in Ohio. 4
Impairment of Capital - Insolvency
Today, most states do not hold a repurchase agreement void at
the time it is made on the ground of lack of "mutuality of obliga-
tion." However, if at the time for repurchase, the corporation is in-
solvent, many states refuse to enforce the agreement because to do so
would prejudice creditors.3 If to allow the repurchase would impair
capital, some states refuse to enforce the agreement because share-
holders, as well as creditors, might be prejudiced.38 Some states per-
mit the repurchase only out of surplus (with various definitions of
surplus), or only where sufficient assets remain to pay corporate
debts. Others allow repurchase only as specifically provided for in
their statutes.3
The Ohio View
The early Ohio courts felt that it was an ultra vires act for a
corporation to purchase its own stock. 8 There was an exception to
this rule when stock was accepted by the corporation in repayment
of a debt.39 In a 1910 case,40 this theory was discarded, and a pur-
33. Id. syllabus 3. See 13 U. CINC. L REv. 586 (1939).
34. See note 24 supra.
35. Henderson v. Garner, 200 Ala. 59, 75 So. 387 (1917); Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co.,
290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935); Davies v. Montana Auto Fin. Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 284
Pac. 267 (1930); Belcowe v. Newman, 136 N.J. Eq. 232, 40 A.2d 812 (1945); Thompson v.
Shepherd, 203 N.C. 310, 165 S.E. 796 (1932).
36. Acker v. Girard Trust Co., 42 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1930); Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Eng'r Co.,
84 Fed. 392 (C.C. Del. 1897); In re Mathews Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal.
1954); Lefker v. Harner, 123 Ark. 575, 186 S.W. 75 (1916); First Nat'1 Bank v. A. Heller
Sawdust Co., 240 Mich. 688, 216 N.W. 464 (1927); Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928).
37. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1177 (1950).
38. E.g., Coppin v. Greenless & Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St. 275 (1882).
39. Burt v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 116 (1876).
40. Siders v. Gem City Concrete Co., 13 Ohio C.CR. (ns.) 481, 23 Ohio C.C. Dec. 552
(1910). In State Banking & Trust Co. v. Mattie Mitchell Co., 14 N.P.(n.s.) 49, 23 Ohio
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chase by a corporation was allowed. The court held that the defense
of ultra vires did not apply because the contract was, at most, void-
able. Twenty years later, in Humphrey v. Koogler,4' repurchase con-
tracts were held valid. The plaintiff was permitted to recover on
the corporation's note, given in exchange for the stock, even though
the defendant asserted that the purchase was invalid. In Squire v.
Rafferty,42 the plaintiff was denied the right to enforce a repurchase
agreement after the corporation had become insolvent. However,
the court recognized that:
The right to enforce such provision [repurchase agreement] is not
denied as between the parties where rights of creditors have not inter-
vened. It is this intervention that affects enforcement43
In Wildermuth v. Lorain Coal and Dock Company,44 the corpora-
tion had a sinking fund which was to be used to redeem preferred
shares. It attempted to use this fund for other purposes, and to
deny any liability to the preferred shareholders. The court held
that the corporation could not do so. It held that only the grounds
permitted by the stock repurchase statute then in effect 45 were avail-
able to deny the validity of the repurchase agreement. Although the
present statute46 is different, the rule of the case, that only the statu-
tory grounds can be used to prevent the enforcement of a stock re-
purchase agreement, still applies. In another case,47 a repurchase
agreement was enforced without reference to the validity of the con-
tract.
Although Ohio does not question the validity of a corporate
agreement to purchase its own stock, by statute,48 it limits the situa-
Dec. 385 (1913), the purchase was held valid where it was made in good faith and the cor-
poration was free from debt.
41. 10 Ohio L. Abs. 42 (Ct. App. 1931); see also General Elec. Supply Co. v. Youngman
Elec. Co., 45 Ohio App. 395, 187 N.E. 249 (1933).
42. 131 Ohio St. 156, 2 N.E.2d 255 (1936).
43. Id. at 164, 2 N.E.2d at 259.
44. 138 Ohio St. 1, 32 N.E.2d 413 (1941).
45. The applicable statutory provision was Ohio General Code 5 8623-41: "Where there is
reasonable ground for believing that such purchase would leave the corporation with assets of
less value than the aggregate of its liabilities over its assets."
46. OHIo REv. CODE § 1701.35 (B) has changed the test to include insolvency.
47. Henry v. Page Dairy Co., 65 Ohio App. 517, 30 N.E.2d 812 (1940).
48. OHio Rsv. CODE § 1701.35 (A): "(A) A corporation by its directors may purchase
shares of any class issued by it, in any of the following instances: (1) When the articles author-
ize the redemption of such shares and do not prohibit such purchase; (2) To collect or com-
promise a debt, claim, or controversy in good faith; (3) From a subscriber whose shares have
not been paid for in full, or in settlement or compromise of a subscription; (4) For offering
and sale, or the grant of options with respect thereto, to any or all of the employees of the
corporation or of subsidiary corporations ... under any plan adopted or to be adopted by the
directors for that purpose; (5) From a person who has purchased such shares from the cor-
poration under an agreement reserving to the corporation the right to repurchase or obligating
it to repurchase; (6) To avoid the issuance of or to eliminate fractional shares; (7) When the
articles in substance provide that the corporation shall have a right to repurchase if and when
any shareholder desires to, or on the happening of any event is required to, sell such shares;
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tions in which a repurchase may be made, as for example, "when
authorized by the articles, or by the shareholders . . . . -4 However,
by statute, 50 even if a repurchase agreement were valid by these cri-
teria, enforcement of the agreement may still be denied if the corpo-
ration is insolvent, or if to allow the repurchase would render the
corporation insolvent, or cause its capital to become impaired.
In Ohio, in order to determine whether capital would be impaired
by the repurchase of corporate stock, it is necessary to understand
what constitutes the corporation's capital accounts. The basic ac-
count is stated capital, which need only contain a minimum of $500,
or, if par value shares are issued, a sum equal to their aggregate par
value if greater than $500.51 The Ohio corporation also has three
surplus accounts: capital surplus, earned surplus, and capital surplus
arising from appreciated assets. 52  The directors or the shareholders
may transfer funds from one surplus account to another, or to stated
capital.5 3  However, only the shareholders may reduce stated capi-
tal,54 but even then, it may not be reduced below the statutory mini-
mum requirement ($500 or the aggregate value of par value shares,
whichever is the greater)."'
When a corporation purchases its own shares, it must reduce
stated capital to the extent of the stated capital represented by the
shares. The balance of the purchase price, if any, is charged to sur-
plus.56 An impairment of capital results when the value of the corpo-
ration's assets is less than its liabilities plus stated capital.5 7  A re-
purchase agreement that will impair capital is unenforceable in Ohio.
A stock redemption may usually be planned in advance to insure
that there will be enough surplus available so that capital will not be
impaired. Stated capital may, within limits, be reduced to increase
surplus, or the directors may create additional surplus by writing up
the appreciated physical assets. Unlike the rule in regard to pay-
ment of dividends, there is no statutory prohibition against using
(8) From a shareholder who by reason of dissent is entitled to be paid the fair cash value of
his shares; (9) When authorized by the articles, or by the shareholders at a meeting called for
such purpose, by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the shares of each class,
regardless of limitations or restrictions in the articles on the voting rights of the shares of any
such class, or, if the articles so provide or permit, a greater or lesser proportion, but not less
than a majority, of the shares of any class."
49. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.35 (A) (9).
50. Omo REV. CODE 5 1701.35 (B).
51. OHI REV. CODE § 1701.30(A).
52. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1701.32 (A), (D).
53. OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1701.32(E), (F). However, surplus arising from unrealized ap-
predation of assets may not be used to write off a deficit in earned surplus. OHIo REv. CODE
§ 1701.32(F).
54. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.31 (E).
55. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.31.
56. OHIO REv. CODE § 1701.31 (A).
57. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.35 (B). Impairment is viewed after the repurchase. Suppose
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surplus created by unrealized appreciation of assets to offset a stock
repurchase. 58 Thus, with planning, it would be unlikely that a corpo-
ration could not fulfill a stock repurchase agreement on the basis that
it would impair capital.59
A corporation cannot purchase its own stock if it is "insolvent, or
if there is reasonable ground to believe that by such purchase it would
be rendered insolvent."60 The equity test of insolvency, not the legal
test, was adopted by Ohio in 1955.61 Thus, a corporation might find
itself insolvent even though it has assets of high value, if the assets
are not readily marketable.
the X Corporation has 100 shares of stock with a par value of $1.00 each. Before the repur-
chase, its balance sheet was:
Assets 80 Liabilities -0-
Capital Stock 100
Capital deficit 20
80 80
Now the corporation redeems 50 shares at 50 cents each, a price below par value. The balance
sheet now shows:
Assets 55 Liabilities -0-
Capital Stock 50
Surplus 5
55 55
This action is legal; the repurchase of the 50 shares automatically reduces stated capital by the
aggregate value of the shares. There is no impairment of capital after the purchase. But sup-
pose the same corporation's balance sheet was:
Assets 120 Liabilities -0-
Capital Stock 100
Surplus 20
120 120
Now 50 shares of stock are repurchased for $2.00 per share, a price above par value. This
would result in an impairment of capital because:
Assets 20 Liabilities -0-
Capital Stock 50
Deficit 30
20 20
58. Dividends may not be paid out of surplus arising from unrealized appreciation of assets.
OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.33 (A).
59. The agreement should contain a clause obligating the remaining shareholders to do every-
thing possible at the time of performance to make the contract enforceable. They should agree
to cause the corporation to write up physical assets and/or to effect a reduction in stated capital
so that the purchase will not impair capital.
60. OHIO REV. CODE 1701.35 (B).
61. OHIO REV. CODE 5 1701.01 (0). " 'Insolvent' means that the corporation is unable to
pay its obligations as they become due in the usual course of its affairs." A corporation is
insolvent under the "legal" test if its liabilities exceed its assets.
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NOTES
Restraints On Alienation
A further limitation on the validity of a stock repurchase agree-
ment is that the agreement must not be an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides that no re-
striction on alienation will be valid against a transferee unless noted
on the stock certificate. 62 The full text of a restriction need not be
written on the certificate. All that is required is reference to the re-
striction and the place where a full copy of it may be found. Nor-
mally, a restraint on alienation is invalid if it totally prohibits trans-
fer.63 This problem generally does not arise in corporate repurchase
plans since these plans allow transfer subject to the conditions of the
agreement.
Remedies
Specific performance is usually granted where the corporation
seeks to enforce the sale of stock.64 The reason is that stock in a
close corporation is not readily obtainable in the market, and, there-
fore, because damages cannot be assessed, there is no adequate
remedy at law.65
However, the shareholder may have difficulty in obtaining spe-
cific performance in that his right is to receive only money. Neverthe-
less, he may be allowed to recover where he can show that there is
no way to determine damages at law because there is no market avail-
able for his stock.66
CONCLUSION
As a practical matter 67 it is important to evaluate each individual
situation to determine what plan, if any, is the best. The lawyer must
not allow tax considerations to overrule good judgment in corporate
management. Perhaps the use of a stock repurchase plan will defeat
the intentions of the shareholders of a small corporation. The at-
torney should apprise his clients of the advantages and disadvantages
of such a plan and be prepared to draft an agreement which will
fulfill their needs.
BERNARD GOODMAN
62. OHIo REV. CODE § 1705.18. The same restriction is imposed in OHIo REv. CODE
1701.25 (B).
63. Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910).
64. Greater New York Carpet House, Inc., v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1940).
65. General Sec. Corp. v. Welton, 223 Ala. 299, 135 So. 329 (1931).
66. Henry v. Page Dairy Co., 65 Ohio App. 517, 30 N.E.2d 812 (1940).
67. Consideration should be given to the use of a trustee to hold the insurance policies and
the stock, endorsed in blank. When one of the parties dies, the trustee automatically turns
the stock over to the corporation and turns the proceeds of the insurance policy over to the
decedents estate. This may prevent a party from refusing or hindering performance of the
agreement.
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